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Rwandan Women No More 
Female Génocidaires in the Aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide  
Erin Jessee 
 
Abstract: Since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the current government has arrested approximately 
130,000 civilians who were suspected of criminal responsibility. An estimated 2,000 were 
women, a cohort that remains rarely researched through an ethnographic lens. This article begins 
to address this oversight by analyzing ethnographic encounters with 8 confessed or convicted 
female génocidaires from around Rwanda. These encounters reveal that female génocidaires 
believe they endure gender-based discrimination for having violated taboos that determine 
appropriate conduct for Rwandan women. However, only female génocidaires with minimal 
education, wealth, and social capital referenced this gender-based discrimination to minimize 
their crimes and assert claims of victimization. Conversely, female elites who helped incite the 
genocide framed their victimization in terms of political betrayal and victor¶s justice. This 
difference is likely informed by the female elites¶ participation in the political processes that 
made the genocide possible, as well as historical precedence for leniency where female elites are 
concerned. 
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In 2013, as part of a fourth-year course on the Ethnography of Political Violence, I assigned my 
students a brief newspaper article on Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the onetime minister of family and 
women¶s affairs who during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda enacted various forms of violence 
against women affiliated with Rwanda¶s Tutsi minority population (Landesman 2002). The 
  
article documents Nyiramasuhuko¶s shift from politician responsible for ensuring the well-being 
of Rwandan women and children, to génocidaire responsible for ordering the mass rape and 
murder of Tutsi women, among other atrocities.1 It draws on interviews with family members 
and friends, as well as women who survived the extreme acts of brutality Nyiramasuhuko 
devised. Her criminal allegations attracted the attention of the Office of the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which charged her with eleven counts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, making her the first woman to stand trial for 
such crimes before an international court of law.2  
In looking over my students¶ reading responses before class, I noticed that several had 
failed to complete the reading, describing it as ³too graphic´ and ³horrific´, and in one instance, 
prompting a student to question her sanity for having chosen to enroll in a course on political 
violence. Yet the Nyiramasuhuko piece was no more graphic than other readings we had 
discussed in the course thus far, nor did it describe events or forms of violence with which the 
students were unfamiliar. During the subsequent class discussion, it became evident that it was 
not the graphic nature of the violence being described that my students found difficult to engage 
with, but rather the fact that the violence had been devised and enacted by a woman, not to 
mention a mother and politician charged with the protection of families. My students were used 
to readings that presented women as victims, survivors, and bystanders of political violence, but 
not as enthusiastic perpetrators. Furthermore, my students recoiled against the fact that so much 
of the violence ordered by Nyiramasuhuko directly targeted women. Many felt that as a woman, 
Nyiramasuhuko should have been above inflicting sexual violence upon other women. As a 
result, they found the reading difficult to complete: it challenged too many of their preconceived 
notions about what constituted appropriate behavior for a woman, even in the midst of political 
  
upheaval, civil war, and genocide. Had she been a man, we concluded, her criminal actions 
would have seemed less distressing. 
My students were not alone in holding female perpetrators of mass atrocities to a higher 
standard than their male counterparts. Though rooted in different cultural, historical, and political 
contexts, a similar pattern persists in post-genocide Rwanda, where female génocidaires are 
frequently subject to prison sentences disproportionate to the crimes they commit, as well as 
gender-specific forms of social and political discrimination.3 Indeed, it is a phenomenon with 
which Rwanda¶s female génocidaires seem acutely familiar, as gender-based discrimination was 
a common theme throughout their life-history narratives that they used to claim space as victims 
in the post-genocide period. However, not all female génocidaires appeared equally vulnerable 
in this regard. The low-level female génocidaires I interviewed²Category 2 or 3 perpetrators 
who typically came from rural farming communities, had minimal education, and married 
young²routinely complained of gender-based discrimination.4 However, the high-level female 
génocidaires I interviewed²Category 1 perpetrators who came from more privileged 
backgrounds²more often complained of non±gender-specific political and social forms of 
discrimination similar to those cited by their male counterparts.5  
This article explores the roots of this phenomenon and its deeper meaning for 
ethnographic inquiry related to female génocidaires. I begin by articulating the methodological 
limitations inherent in conducting ethnographic fieldwork among convicted female génocidaires 
in Rwanda, and the various ethical negotiations that resulted. I then examine the changing status 
of women within Rwandan society in historical perspective to contextualize the experiences of 
three female génocidaires²Devota, Egidie, and Valerie²whose narratives then become the 
focus of the article. These three women come from different socioeconomic backgrounds and 
  
regions, making their experiences broadly representative of the cultural, historical, and political 
processes affecting female génocidaires in the post-genocide period. I argue that although female 
génocidaires are perhaps judged disproportionately for their crimes due to Rwandan customs that 
govern women¶s behavior even during periods of crisis, the effects are felt and expressed most 
keenly by women of lower socioeconomic status. However, ethnographers must exercise caution 
in engaging with these narratives of victimization. In my experience, female génocidaires often 
leveraged their experiences of discrimination and disenfranchisement to distract attention away 
from their criminal actions during the 1994 genocide, which poses a critical challenge for 
analysis. 
 
Ethnography among Génocidaires? 
Ethnographic inquiry surrounding recent or ongoing mass atrocities is fraught with challenges, 
from formulating an ethically and methodologically sound research design, to gaining access to 
regions or communities affected by violence and political upheaval, to making sense of the often 
competing narratives that result from fieldwork with participants who have been polarized by 
personal experiences of mass violence and its aftermath. Yet the work of pioneering 
ethnographers such as Carolyn Nordstrom (1997), Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993, 1997, 2002), 
Antonius Robben (1996, 2000, 2005), and Alexander Hinton (2002, 2005) demonstrates the 
value of applying ethnographic methods and theory to the study of mass atrocities. By 
embedding themselves in communities and conflicts, and documenting the experiences of 
individuals whose lives have been intimately affected by violence, they have revealed the 
complexities of political violence, from its more subtle everyday manifestations in the structures 
  
that surround us to less frequent but more overt episodes of war, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity.  
With this in mind, I conducted 8 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Rwanda in 2007 
and 2008 with the purpose of examining the symbolic capital associated with particular patterns 
of violence that had emerged surrounding the 1994 genocide (Jessee 2010).6 I conducted 
multiple life history and thematic interviews with more than 50 Rwandans who had been directly 
affected by the 1994 genocide as survivors, génocidaires, and/or bystanders, as well as Rwandan 
government officials, academics, and community leaders. Of these participants, 20 were 
génocidaires who had either confessed or been convicted of crimes related to the 1994 genocide, 
and were serving sentences in one of Rwanda¶s prisons.7 Though I had hoped to interview an 
equal number of male and female génocidaires, women proved more difficult to recruit, and in 
the end only 8 women consented to participate in the project. Despite the small sample size, their 
narratives are broadly representative of the estimated 2,000 female génocidaires serving 
sentences in Rwanda²a cohort that is widely discussed, though with primary emphasis placed 
on survivors¶ and government officials¶ accounts of their criminal actions, as well as court 
transcripts, rather than the firsthand accounts of the women themselves (African Rights 1995; 
Brown 2013; Hogg 2010; Sharlach 1999). As a result, there is much we do not know about 
Rwanda¶s female génocidaires. 
The methodology that surrounded my fieldwork among female génocidaires would be 
unrecognizable to most classical ethnographers. While I immersed myself in everyday life in 
Rwanda, engaging Rwandans, wherever possible, in casual conversations, and otherwise seeking 
out opportunities for participant observation, the circumstances of my fieldwork in Rwanda¶s 
prisons were often beyond my control. I acquired a research permit through the Ministry of 
  
Internal Security that gave me permission to interview génocidaires in five prisons, but was not 
given permission to enter the main prison buildings. In each case, I conducted interviews in a 
private office just inside the prison gate where the prison administrators worked, but removed 
from where the génocidaires lived out their daily lives. Thus, I was unable to see for myself the 
conditions under which my participants lived, or observe or experience firsthand any of the 
challenges or limitations they described in narrating their post-genocide lives.  
Language was an additional challenge. Prior to arriving in Rwanda, I had studied 
French²then Rwanda¶s second official language²with the understanding that it was widely 
spoken by Rwandans. Upon arriving in Rwanda, however, it became clear that a transition away 
from Rwanda¶s Francophone colonial past was under way, orchestrated by Rwanda¶s ruling 
party²the predominantly Anglophone Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).8 Speaking French was 
associated with the pre-genocide regimes of Hutu presidents Grégoire Kayibanda (1962±1973) 
and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973±1994), and so most Rwandans embraced the transition²at least 
in public²to avoid being labeled political dissidents by the RPF. Furthermore, French rarely 
proved helpful outside of Rwanda¶s cities, as many rural Rwandans had completed only a few 
years of education and spoke Rwanda¶s indigenous language, Kinyarwanda, far more fluently 
than French. As a result, I found myself relying on Rwandan research assistants who provided 
simultaneous translation from Kinyarwanda to English, and helped transcribe all recorded 
interviews to ensure accuracy.  
My reliance on research assistants introduced unexpected challenges. In post-genocide 
Rwanda, where discussion of ethnic categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa has become taboo, my 
research assistants¶ ethnicity, as perceived by individual participants, quickly translated into 
assumed political loyalties.9 Both of my research assistants were of Rwandan Tutsi descent, but 
  
based on their accents, manner of dress and relative affluence, fluency in English, and occasional 
resistance to Rwandan social norms, my participants often immediately recognized them to be 
returnees or old caseload refugees²Rwandans who had grown up in diasporic communities 
throughout the Great Lakes region of Africa, their families having fled periods of anti-Tutsi 
violence associated with the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the subsequent leadership of Hutu 
President Grégoire Kayibanda (Burnet 2012: 237n3).  
Among government officials²most of whom are members of the RPF, not to mention 
themselves Tutsi returnees²hiring returnees as research assistants opened doors. My research 
assistants could relate to officials¶ experiences of exile and return to Rwanda in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1994 genocide to help rebuild the nation, establishing immediate bonds on 
several occasions. During initial meetings, several officials expressed relief upon learning my 
research assistants were returnees, often noting that they would, as a result, be better positioned 
to help me make sense of the ³New Rwanda´ and the lies to which I would allegedly be exposed 
while speaking with génocidaires and rural Rwandans. Among survivors, however, my research 
assistants¶ backgrounds could introduce tensions, particularly in the early stages of recruitment 
and establishment of informed consent. It appeared that shared Tutsi heritage was rarely 
sufficient to overcome the perceived political differences between those Tutsi who had been born 
and raised in Rwanda and Tutsi returnees. Many Rwandan Tutsi, as survivors of the 1994 
genocide, were resentful of returnees who in most instances had been spared the worst of the 
genocide, yet were perceived as consistently receiving preferential treatment from the RPF. 
Much like the government officials with whom I met, Rwanda-born Tutsi often assumed that my 
research assistants, as returnees, would be loyal to the RPF, which they frequently claimed was 
oblivious to the needs of rural Rwandans, and was quick to persecute civilians who spoke out 
  
against the poverty and fear that characterized everyday life in their communities.10 As a result, 
initial conversations and interviews were often guarded, with survivors only opening up about 
their lived experiences and interpretations of life surrounding the 1994 genocide and post-
genocide Rwanda after they felt confident that we were not government informers. Among 
génocidaires, my research assistants were similarly assumed to be government agents, which 
often introduced a combative tone to the subsequent conversations and interviews that again took 
time to overcome. Thus, in early interviews, génocidaires¶narratives often reflected the 
³sensitization´ they had received as part of ingando²a rehabilitation program that educates 
génocidaires in the ways of the ³New Rwanda´²while in later interviews, they spoke more 
openly (Thomson 2013: 51).  
My research assistants, meanwhile, often found it difficult to put aside their personal 
political opinions, particularly when dealing with individuals who decided to voice 
interpretations of Rwandan history that did not align with the RPF¶s official narrative²a subject 
that is closely controlled by the RPF¶s nationalized commemoration and transitional justice 
programs.11 As a result, I learned to clarify even the smallest details with my research assistants 
to allow me to distinguish between what was actually said by my research participants, and my 
research assistants¶ interpretations, which they sometimes offered unprompted, to correct what 
they perceived to be a false understanding or politically subversive interpretation of events. Such 
strategies were particularly necessary in the prisons where, due to government restrictions, I was 
not permitted to bring recording equipment beyond a pen and notebook. As such, we spent a 
great deal of time verifying individual participants¶ narratives and checking preliminary findings 
they might have informed to ensure that my subsequent representations of their narratives were 
accurate. Easing the process, over time my research assistants came to understand that I was not 
  
interested in merely establishing a factual historical account of what happened in Rwanda during 
the 1994 genocide, but in examining how Rwandans from different backgrounds made sense of 
their experiences of violence and its aftermath. 
For my part, my fieldwork in the prisons took place during my first trip to Rwanda in 
2007 and 2008. As a young Canadian woman with no prior experience in Rwanda, I was 
unaware of the highly politicized research setting I would be encountering, as it was rarely 
discussed in the literature on the region, nor did I have many contacts who had experience 
working in the country.12 As a result, I was poorly prepared for the tensions I encountered in the 
prisons between my research assistants and the génocidaires who were interviewed, as well as 
within Rwanda more generally. Likewise, I was poorly prepared for the tensions associated with 
the subtle forms of government surveillance and interference I encountered throughout my 
fieldwork. On an average day, I navigated polite requests from prison directors and other 
administrative staff to meet at the end of my interviews, at which time I was asked for the names 
of the people I had interviewed and the content of our conversations. The reason they cited for 
wanting to see my fieldnotes was to ensure that the génocidaires I interviewed were not 
confessing to crimes in addition to those for which they had been convicted, opening up the 
possibility that the officials intended to use my fieldnotes to bring new legal charges against my 
research participants. My refusal to provide this information, citing the terms of the ethics 
approval I had received from my university and the need to maintain my research participants¶ 
confidentiality, as well as minimize harm to them, was first met with attempts to negotiate: one 
prison administrator offered to arrange further interviews with released prisoners in the 
community if I turned over my fieldnotes, and another offered to open up the prison archives to 
me so I could compare my fieldnotes with the files they had on the prisoners I had interviewed. 
  
My continued refusal to share information provoked increased hostility from one prison director 
in particular, and ultimately led me to discontinue my fieldwork in the prisons a few weeks 
before my fieldwork was scheduled to end. Furthermore, it left me keenly aware of the risks 
inherent in conducting ethnography in Rwanda¶s prisons and other institutions wherein 
researchers often have little power to protect the confidentiality of the génocidaires with whom 
they work, so long as they are reliant on the goodwill of official gatekeepers.  
 
On Rwandan Women: Ideals and Expectations 
Before delving into the narratives constructed by female génocidaires in the prisons, it is 
important to consider the shifting status of Rwandan women in Rwandan society over time. This 
analysis is limited by the fact that there are significant gaps in the historical and anthropological 
record related to Rwandan women and the gender norms that have influenced their everyday 
lives at different periods in Rwanda¶s past. Whereas Rwandan women have made significant 
contributions to Rwandan history that were preserved in oral histories prior to the colonial 
period²particularly as Queen Mothers (umugabekazi) within Rwanda¶s monarchy²many of 
these accounts have been lost or diminished over time as the colonial interests of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century European historians took precedence. Until recently, the resulting German, 
French, and English historiographies on Rwanda were dominated almost entirely by myths and 
accounts of Rwandan political elites affiliated with the royal court, in which Rwandan women 
were, with few exceptions, mentioned only in passing and only in instances where they had a 
significant influence on Rwandan politics.13 
Nonetheless, modern experts on Rwanda suggest that in the decades immediately prior to 
the genocide, Rwandan women were largely excluded from politics, commerce, law, and 
  
education compared to their male compatriots (Burnet 2011, 2013; Jefremovas 1991; Karake 
1998; Nowrojee 1996; Sharlach 1999). The ideal for Rwandan women was to be reserved, 
submissive, respectful, silent, and maternal, focusing their energies on maintaining a respectable 
household and raising polite children (Burnet 2013). Women who did not conform or who 
actively resisted such expectations could be publicly mocked and ostracized for transgressing 
Rwandan gender norms. For example, Villia Jefremovas  (1991: 379) observed that ³the 
language of public morality and stereotype is one weapon ... used by both men and women to 
interpret, manipulate, validate, or negate control over labour, resources and surplus´ produced by 
women.  
Some of the strongest taboos limiting women¶s activities in the past have pertained to 
violence. Prior to 1973, it was relatively uncommon for Rwandan women to participate in 
warfare, beyond providing indirect morale and materiel support to their male family and 
community members.14 Women were not allowed on the battlefield until after the fighting had 
ceased, and were even prohibited from handling weapons, as it was believed that this would 
bring bad fortune upon the owner, resulting in his death or serious injury. This does not mean 
that Rwandan women were unable to inflict physical violence on others in everyday life if they 
so chose: they have an impressive reputation in Rwandan popular culture, even today, as 
poisoners and deft manipulators, particularly when it comes to Rwanda¶s political arena. For 
example, Kanjogera is a classic and often referenced example of a Rwandan woman who²with 
the support of her brothers²used murder, lies, and manipulations to initiate a civil war that 
culminated in the assassination of her adopted son, King Rutarindwa (1895±1896), and the 
ascension to the throne of her biological son, King Musinga (1896±1931) (Des Forges 2011: 14±
17). She is remembered in popular culture as a dangerous and bloodthirsty individual who 
  
paralyzed with fear political opponents who otherwise might have attempted to wrest political 
power for themselves and their clans (Jessee and Watkins 2014: 52. To this end, the nickname 
³Kanjogera´ is occasionally applied to presidential first ladies Agathe Habyarimana (née 
Kanziga) and Jeannette Kagame (née Nyiramonji), both of whom are said to have exercised a 
high degree of influence in Rwandan politics through their husbands.  
However, the inclusion of ordinary Rwandan women in conflict and warfare has been 
more recent. In 1973, surrounding a brief military coup that saw Hutu President Juvénal 
Habyarimana rise to power, Rwandan women were²for the first time²active participants in 
political violence, in this instance targeting Rwanda¶s Tutsi minority population and affiliates of 
the regime of the previous president, Grégoire Kayibanda.15 African Rights (1995) collected 
testimonies from around Rwanda that recalled Hutu women as enthusiastic participants in anti-
Tutsi massacres in 1973, informing the authorities which people were Tutsi, participating in the 
torture and murder of civilians, and looting from the dead. According to Luc Reydams (2013), 
many African Rights reports were informed by data and analysis provided by the RPF²hence, 
its overarching tendency to portray female perpetrators of ethnic and political violence in 
Rwanda in rather simplistic terms: as enthusiastic perpetrators motivated in particular by anti-
Tutsi hatred. Nonetheless, their 1995 report accurately notes that once the 1973 massacres ceased, 
the perpetrators were not brought to justice, nor were reparations offered to surviving Tutsi. The 
Habyarimana regime, while initially appearing sympathetic to the Tutsi minority population, 
proved little better than the Kayibanda regime at asserting and protecting their rights. Therefore, 
participation in the 1973 massacres²including that of Rwandan women²although not 
unnoticed or forgotten by the survivors, was never prosecuted.  
  
With the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990, Rwanda entered into a period of political 
upheaval. As news of RPF atrocities against Hutu civilians in the north spread to other regions of 
Rwanda, and allegations that Rwanda¶s Tutsi population was providing support to the inyenzi 
spread through various extremist media outlets, Rwanda¶s recently reintroduced multiparty 
system split along ethnic and political lines.16 Fearing that the consequences of the RPF invasion 
would include a return of Tutsi domination, many Hutu civilians were drawn to the platforms of 
the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le dévelopement (MRND) and the 
increasingly extremist Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR) parties.17 With the 
creation of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias, and the Radio Télévision Libre des 
Mille Collines (RTLM), these Hutu Power±based parties began priming the Hutu majority for 
violence. Female political elites, such as First Lady Agathe Habyarimana, Minister of Family 
and Women¶s Affairs Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, and RTLM journalist Valerie Bemeriki, among 
others, were allegedly key actors in this shift toward ethnic and political extremism.  
Then, on 6 April 1994, Habyarimana¶s plane was shot down as it attempted to land in 
Kigali.18 Habyarimana¶s Presidential Guard mobilized immediately, executing Hutu moderate 
and Tutsi politicians in Kigali. Over the next few weeks, the violence escalated to become a 
genocide of Tutsi civilians and their perceived collaborators, including in some instances Hutu 
and Twa civilians whose only crime was to refuse to participate in the murder of their neighbors. 
By the time the RPF wrested control of the nation in late July, an estimated 400,000 to 800,000 
civilians²most of whom were members of Rwanda¶s Tutsi minority²were dead.19 An 
additional 2 million civilians followed the remnants of the Hutu Power movement into the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), creating the foundation for two decades of political 
upheaval and violence in the Kivus.20  
  
In the post-genocide period, some of the barriers affecting women in Rwanda¶s public 
sphere are diminishing. Whereas in pre-genocide Rwanda, women predominantly gained status 
through their modest behavior, marriage, and raising of well-mannered children, the RPF is 
pursuing a policy of gender inclusivity that encourages women¶s involvement in all levels of the 
government and allows them to inherit, hold property, and exercise economic autonomy. 
Following the September 2013 parliamentary elections, women hold 64 percent of the seats in 
Rwanda¶s parliament (Government of Rwanda 2013). This is a stark contrast to pre-genocide 
Rwanda, in which women filled no more than 17 percent of parliamentary seats, and occupied no 
mayoral or prefect positions (Nowrojee 1996; Sharlach 1999). More generally, Burnet (2011: 
303) finds that women in post-genocide Rwanda enjoy ³increased respect from family and 
community members, enhanced capacity to speak and be heard in public forums, greater 
autonomy in decision-making in the family, and increased access to education.´  
However, Rwandan women still face many struggles when it comes to realizing gender 
equality. In particular, rural women often find it difficult to assert themselves independently 
from their husbands, fathers, or brothers, or to take on roles that are perceived to be the sole 
domain of men. For example, Jennie Burnet has documented modern usage of the phrase Ni 
igishegabo²translated as ³she¶s a big man-woman´²to insult women who are outspoken and 
aggressive, despite the fact that these traits are prized when displayed by Rwandan men (Burnet 
2012: 45). Similarly, Marie Berry¶s (2013) work among Rwandan women who composed the 
nation¶s informal or agricultural sectors found that the benefits of gender equality policies were 
not being realized except among a small minority of Rwandan political elites. This trend emerges 
in large part from the cost-prohibitive nature of education and rents and permits for small 
businesses, and the various forms of structural violence to which many rural Rwandan women 
  
are vulnerable precisely because their lack of success contradicts the image of the ³New Rwanda´ 
that the RPF is determined to uphold. In sum, it seems that Rwandan women political elites are 
better positioned to take advantages of the RPF¶s policy reforms for promoting gender equality 
than their rural counterparts, though even this conclusion is subject to debate. Recently, Susan 
Thomson (2015) argued that while Rwandan women¶s visibility in public life is at an all-time 
high, their ability to shape their nation¶s future is limited by the fact that President Kagame and 
his advisers dominate parliament, making it difficult for women parliamentarians to implement 
meaningful changes. She concludes that ³[t]he number of Rwandan female parliamentarians 
glosses over their limited role in policymaking, the continued marginalization of the vast 
majority of Rwandan women, and the government¶s superficial commitment to democratic 
governance´ (Thomson 2015: 20±21). 
A similarly complex picture emerges from the narratives of female génocidaires. The 
following discussion begins with the narrative of Devota²a peasant woman turned génocidaire 
whose experiences of gender-based discrimination within the prison system and in post-genocide 
Rwandan society more generally undermined her ability to self-identify as Rwandan and as a 
woman. Her experiences are broadly representative of the six other rural female génocidaires 
with whom I worked. Each of these women fit within the categories of salaried poor (umukene 
wifashije), poor (umukene), ³destitute´ (umutindi), or living in abject poverty (umutindi 
nyakujya) prior to the genocide, placing them among the majority of Rwandans at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy.21 However, I then turn to the cases of Egidie and Valerie²two female 
génocidaires who demonstrated remarkable resilience to this gender-based discrimination. I 
argue that this resilience emerges in part from their heightened political and social status prior to 
and during the 1994 genocide. Though both women were educated professionals, and exercised 
  
varying degrees of political power within their communities far beyond what their rural 
counterparts enjoyed. And while they too presented themselves as victims, their complaints were 
framed in terms of political oppression and manipulation, rather than gender-based 
discrimination. 
 
A ³Weak Woman´: Devota 
Devota was, by all accounts, a monster. Prior to our first meeting, prison administrators and 
génocidaires alike had referenced her as a particularly infamous figure within the prison who, 
during the genocide, killed unarmed Tutsi women and children in particularly brutal ways using 
household implements. Adding to her fearsome reputation, she was heavily pregnant during the 
genocide²a factor that would have allowed her to excuse herself from the violence. Nonetheless, 
Devota allegedly chose to participate in the torture and murder of her Tutsi neighbors. Her 
crimes were so brutal and so widely condemned by her surrounding community that several 
people had voluntarily testified against her before gacaca²a locally conceived system of dispute 
resolution that was adapted by the RPF to address the backlog of génocidaires awaiting trial.22 
Devota had further demonstrated her monstrous nature by allegedly appearing remorseless 
before gacaca, refusing to confess to the crimes of which she had been accused or apologize to 
the surviving families of the people she had harmed.23  
Devota did not consent to be interviewed because she had a strong desire to assist with an 
international project on the 1994 genocide and its aftermath. Conversely, like so many convicted 
perpetrators, she saw each interview as an opportunity to glimpse the world beyond the prison 
where she had lived uninterrupted since her arrest in 2001. There was also an element of 
opportunism underlying her consent, as she asked as her first point of business whether there was 
  
anything I could do to help those prisoners, like herself, who were imprisoned unjustly because 
of petty jealousies and lies rather than due to actual criminal activities. She admitted that she had 
been found guilty of killing Tutsi women and children by stabbing them with small wooden 
skewers used for cooking meat brochette, and sentenced to fifteen years. However, Devota 
maintained she had committed no such crimes during the genocide. She had witnessed a murder, 
and had asked the victim¶s family for forgiveness for failing to intervene on the victim¶s behalf. 
She also confessed to looting the homes of murdered Tutsi in her community. But in terms of the 
Category 2 crimes of which she was accused, Devota maintained her innocence, and lamented 
the harsh sentence she had received.  
Throughout our interviews, Devota consistently described herself as ³just a normal 
person´ who, as a woman, was in no way capable of the crimes of which she had been accused. 
She explained that prior to the genocide, she had been a poor farmer. Her family was often 
unable to afford food beyond what they grew, and for this reason, Devota was illiterate and had 
minimal education. She claimed she never felt unsafe in the years prior to the genocide, and felt 
no animosity toward her Tutsi compatriots. She only began feeling unsafe after the genocide 
when a neighboring merchant, fearing imprisonment by the RPF, threatened her so she would 
remain silent after she witnessed him murder a Tutsi man during the genocide. While Devota 
knew the man¶s murder was wrong, at the time she did not interfere because the victim had a 
reputation in her community for being proud and selfish. 7KHPHUFKDQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRFRPPLW
murder was motivated by the fact that the victim had refused to lend the merchant money some 
months earlier.  
As for the other charges against her, Devota claimed that a Tutsi neighbor with whom she 
had lived for many years in peace had invented the story of her having killed Tutsi women and 
  
children with brochettes. Prior to her 2001 arrest, her accuser¶s cousin had asked to buy Devota¶s 
land. Devota refused, and shortly after was arrested on suspicion of murdering Tutsi during the 
genocide. She was adamant that her imprisonment was punishment for her refusal to sell her land. 
After her arrest, her land would have passed to her husband and children to cultivate or sell. 
Devota had not seen or heard from them since she had arrived in prison, and so had no idea what 
they had decided to do. She suspected, however, that her arrest had prompted her family to sell 
and to leave the community so as to minimize the social stigmatization they would otherwise 
endure for supporting a génocidaire.24  
However, Devota¶s story changed in important ways over the course of our interviews. 
While she continuously professed her innocence, she added details that further stressed her 
identity as a victim in the post-genocide period. She repeatedly referred to herself as a ³weak 
woman´ who was incapable of torture or killing anyone, and stressed how being in prison had 
negatively and unjustly affected her life. She stated that she was no longer Rwandan or a 
woman²that both aspects of her identity had been taken from her by those responsible for her 
imprisonment. In her opinion, women were defined by staying at home and taking care of their 
husbands and children, a privilege that Devota had been denied since her arrest in 2001. As a 
result of her arrest and inability to care for her family, they had apparently rejected her, having 
never visited her in prison. Devota realized they were likely suffering as well due to her arrest: in 
addition to the loss of her labor, the families of génocidaires were often subject to subtle forms 
of discrimination within their communities. When the rumors of her complicity in the 1994 
genocide began to circulate, Devota recalled that people began passing her on the street without 
greeting her, and refusing to buy her produce. It was worse for a woman, she argued, because 
  
women were supposed to be pure and incapable of harming others, but her husband and children 
were certainly being stigmatized too.  
Devota was formally denied other privileges. Unlike male génocidaires, who 
occasionally perform community labor and related activities outside the prison, Devota was 
confined to her shared cell or the room where she worked with other women to make and repair 
prisoners¶ uniforms.25 Adding to her suffering, Devota found her gender had been further 
rendered obsolete by the conditions imposed upon her as part of everyday prison life. In 
particular, she found the shapeless pink uniform worn by génocidaires demoralizing because it 
obscured both her gender and her individuality. Combined with the shaved hairstyle demanded 
by the authorities to prevent the spread of lice, Devota felt there was nothing to distinguish her 
from the countless other women prisoners with whom she lived. As a result, Devota suffered far 
more than she felt she deserved, particularly given she was innocent. 
Devota¶s narrative was broadly representative of the challenges faced by the other 
Category 2 and 3 female génocidaires I interviewed in the prisons. In terms of background, they 
were all subsistence farmers from rural communities whose lives were characterized by moderate 
to extreme poverty. As a result, they had achieved only basic levels of education, and had 
married young in order to provide their families with much-needed dowries. They had multiple 
children, and prior to the 1994 genocide, had viewed child rearing and the maintenance of their 
homes and farms as their primary responsibilities. None of them admitted to having harbored or 
even known about the possibility of anti-Tutsi sentiments prior to the start of the 1994 genocide, 
and in discussing their alleged crimes, only one woman ever confessed to participating in the acts 
of torture and murder of which she had been accused.26 The other Category 2 and 3 female 
génocidaires confessed only to informing on Tutsi, revealing their hiding places to the attackers, 
  
and looting the properties that were left behind. In all instances, they claimed their actions were 
not motivated by anti-Tutsi sentiment or genocidal intent, but rather by fear of social 
repercussions within their communities if they refused to support the killers, as well as 
occasional indifference to the fates of the victims due to a history of interpersonal conflict within 
the community. 
In addition, these low-level female génocidaires frequently referenced the gender-based 
discrimination they endured and its impact on their ability to identify as Rwandan women. They 
endured abandonment by some, if not all, of their family members²particularly their husbands 
and children²because their complicity in genocidal violence was inevitably interpreted as 
evidence that they were monsters, in addition to being bad wives and mothers. Unlike the male 
génocidaires I interviewed, who received visitors according to their family¶s resources and were 
given gifts of valuable commodities like sugar to improve their well-being in the prisons, low-
level female génocidaires claimed to receive little support from the outside world. They instead 
relied on the goodwill of prison administrators or prisoners who were willing to share or 
purchase necessities on their behalf in exchange for money or sexual favors. The resulting 
system of exploitation was not something that female génocidaires could discuss in much detail 
given it still surrounded them and they were dependent upon it for their daily survival, but they 
all acknowledged its existence and the negative impact it had on their morale.  
 
Pride and Resilience: Egidie and Valerie 
However, some female génocidaires seemed better positioned to resist the gender-based 
discrimination that surrounded them. Egidie and Valerie were alone among the female 
génocidaires I interviewed in that they enjoyed heightened status within the prisons related to 
  
having held positions of political prominence prior to the genocide. This in turn appeared to 
insulate them against some of the gender-based discrimination that negatively affected the lives 
of their more rural and less educated compatriots. In Egidie¶s case, while her family initially 
relied on agriculture for their day-to-day survival, they were wealthy compared to their 
surrounding community. As such, Egidie was not required to work full-time in the fields. She 
completed her education without interruption, married into a high-status family, and pursued a 
career as a cell-level government official, while raising seven children.  
Egidie¶s career was a source of pride throughout her life history. While by no means the 
highest position a woman could attain, becoming a cell leader with the start of the civil war in 
1990 set her apart from the Rwandan majority economically, politically, and socially. Egidie 
attended government meetings at the local and national level in which she observed growing 
tensions among MRND members, several of whom joined the CDR in 1992. Around this time, 
the local police and military began arbitrarily arresting Tutsi elites, and in several instances, 
killed people²whether Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa²who tried to intervene. 
Despite growing tensions and violence in her community, Egidie remained committed to 
her work, even as her responsibilities shifted. Early in 1993, she was told to prepare her office: 
her superiors said the enemy was coming to take Rwanda, and there would not be enough land 
and wealth for everyone. Egidie was instructed to watch for spies in the community, and report 
all new arrivals to the local police so they could be thoroughly investigated. Simultaneously, 
during meetings with district-level authorities, she observed weapons being distributed to the 
men in her office, and heard rumors that they were being trained to protect the community 
against the inyenzi.  
  
In the weeks leading up to the genocide, Egidie was ordered to create lists of all Tutsi 
living in the area. Though she claimed she did not know their purpose, she recalled feeling 
fearful. There was a heightened police and military presence in her community, and everyone 
seemed to be joining the Interahamwe, which in her experience made them drink too much, carry 
weapons, and act like they were above the law. Egidie discussed fleeing with her family, but they 
concluded there was no place to go. Other Rwandan towns were rumored to be experiencing the 
same problems, and with everyone being watched, it was not safe to be an outsider.  
Nonetheless, the 1994 genocide caught Egidie by surprise. She awoke on 7 April 1994 to 
the news that President Habyarimana had been murdered by the inyenzi and that all of Rwanda 
was at war with the Tutsi²not just the RPF. In the days following Habyarimana¶s assassination, 
rumors about the political killings in Kigali circulated and in her community a handful of Tutsi 
elites²those, she claimed, who were not well-liked²were murdered. However, for Egidie the 
full brutality of the genocide did not become evident until some weeks later, when she witnessed 
an attack on an elderly neighbor by a mob who wanted the woman¶s cattle. Egidie immediately 
brought the six Tutsi orphans who had been living with the woman into her home in an effort to 
rescue them from a similar fate. But local soldiers soon discovered (JLGLH¶Vdeception, and, in an 
effort to take the three girls as sex slaves, beat all but one of the orphans to death. Egidie 
continued to hide the surviving child and helped him recover from his wounds before 
encouraging him to flee.  
As the RPF advanced on Egidie¶s community, she and her family decided to flee with the 
remnants of the interim government toward the DRC. In justifying this decision, Egidie did not, 
like other génocidaires I interviewed, mention the atrocities being perpetrated by Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) troops against Hutu civilians.27 Instead, her decision seemed motivated by 
  
loyalty and opportunism²specifically, the realization that her career prospects and security were 
likely better with the interim government. But as the RPF restored peace in Rwanda and the 
genocide and related mass atrocities came to a close, Egidie and her family decided to return 
home and take up farming²the only option available to them, she noted, as Hutu and ex-MRND 
loyalists. They lived peacefully until 2007, when their neighbors formally accused Egidie and 
her husband of having been directly responsible for the murder of Tutsi civilians during the 
genocide. Egidie acknowledged that in the case of her husband, these accusations were true²he 
had participated in the murder of countless Tutsi civilians at the roadblocks in their community. 
But she maintained that she had never directly harmed anyone and had been wrongly imprisoned.  
Like Devota, Egidie often referred to herself as a victim. However, in complaining about 
her situation, Egidie did not resort to the same complaints of gender-based discrimination that 
were common among lower-level female génocidaires. Indeed, she seemed to have had a 
different experience of prison life in many regards: her pink uniform, though still basic, was 
well-fitted and subtly decorated; she received continued support from her extended family in the 
form of regular visits and gifts of sugar and other valuable commodities; and in discussing her 
life before the genocide, she simultaneously exhibited pride and demanded respect for her many 
accomplishments. And while she condemned the RPF for imprisoning her without a fair trial, she 
blamed victor¶s justice²the fact that the RPF had won the war instead of the interim 
government²for her fate. Not once during our interviews did she reference her gender identity 
to explain why she was incapable of perpetrating the crimes of which she had been accused, for 
example. In fact, her frustrations surrounding having been identified, charged, and convicted as a 
génocidaire were very similar to those of the male génocidaires I interviewed, as were her 
complaints about her quality of life in the prison, which in the rare instances when she raised the 
  
subject, focused on overcrowding and the general lack of good food. Overall, she did not seem 
invested in presenting herself as a victim of gender-based discrimination.  
A similar pattern was evident in my interviews with the infamous RTLM journalist 
Valerie Bemeriki.28 Valerie did not like speaking about her family or her family¶s associates in 
any detail, nor was she particularly open about her past prior to 1993, when she joined the 
RTLM. At the time when our interviews occurred, she was writing a memoir and was 
determined to minimize the stigmatization her family would endure. Certain general features of 
her early family life could be discerned from her broader life history, however. For example, 
Valerie was clearly well-educated, having completed primary and secondary school, followed by 
higher education in France facilitated by friends of her parents. This suggests that her family was 
comparatively wealthy and well-connected enough to provide their daughter with ample 
opportunities for personal and professional development.  
Valerie¶s rise to prominence began in 1990 with the start of the civil war. Valerie seemed 
fairly unique among génocidaires: despite having had minimal interest in Rwandan politics prior 
to 1990, she claimed to understand immediately that the RPF invasion represented a serious 
threat to Rwanda¶s political stability, and particularly the well-being of the Hutu majority. She 
was swept up in what she referred to as the ³wind of multipartyism´ and joined the MRND, 
which she accurately perceived to be the most powerful party and the most likely to champion 
the rights of the Rwandan people in the fight against the RPF. After a brief stint as a secretary for 
a high-level MRND official who fired her for having a minor disability, she began taking night 
classes with the intention of becoming a journalist. Shortly after, Valerie was hired to write for 
an MRND newspaper. She quickly gained a following within the MRND for her skills in 
  
advocating ceaselessly for Hutu rights and mercilessly criticizing the other parties, particularly 
the RPF.  
With the creation of the RTLM in 1993, Valerie was invited to apply for a position as a 
radio broadcaster. The interview process involved passing exams that tested political knowledge 
and writing skills, and meeting high-level MRND officials who quizzed candidates on their 
political beliefs and adherence to the official history that dominated Rwanda under the 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes.29 As someone who had gained a reputation for writing on 
the failure of the 1959 Hutu Revolution to secure the long-term political dominance of the Hutu 
majority, Valerie had no trouble in the interview. She was hired with the following guidelines: 
say only positive things about the MRND; say only negative things about the RPF; and 
contradict anything that the RPF¶s Radio Muhabura was saying about their plans for Rwanda¶s 
future.30  
Early in 1994, these guidelines were expanded to include spreading anti-Tutsi 
propaganda more generally, such as publicizing instances where Tutsi were allegedly killing 
Hutu civilians or naming alleged RPF spies in particular communities. Valerie went along with 
this shift in policy because at this point she had learned enough about RPF atrocities against 
Hutu civilians to know that the RPF, should they win the civil war, were intent on destroying the 
Hutu. Furthermore, she did not attempt to verify the information she was being given because 
she knew that everything she wrote or said would be passed through the RTLM¶s censorship 
committee, and that there would be extreme consequences for challenging any story or angle that 
was being promoted by the RTLM leadership. In hindsight, however, Valerie recognized that she 
had been a pawn: she claimed she thought she was saving lives by rallying people against the 
  
RPF and, later, Rwanda¶s Tutsi minority population, when in actual fact she was priming 
Rwandans to accept and participate in the murder of innocent Tutsi. 
Valerie¶s criminal actions did not stop at broadcasting propaganda in the months 
preceding the genocide, however. Following Habyarimana¶s assassination, Valerie took to the 
airwaves to condemn the RPF for murdering Rwanda¶s president because she thought that as a 
woman, the only weapon she had to help win the war was her radio show. As the genocide 
gained momentum, she traveled around those regions of Rwanda that were not yet occupied by 
the RPA, and made public appearances in which she dressed as a member of the Interahamwe 
and gave speeches aimed at inciting anti-Tutsi violence, sometimes encouraging people to kill 
specific groups of Tutsi refugees that were passing through their communities. In discussing her 
actions during this period, Valerie repeatedly noted that she said only ³what people wanted to 
hear´ and that if she had refused to participate in these political meetings, the MRND would 
have simply found someone to replace her.  
However, transcripts of her RTLM broadcasts and speeches during this period suggest 
that Valerie was a more enthusiastic participant than she was willing to admit, and that, as in the 
case of many other génocidaires, she was attempting to minimize her criminal responsibility.31 
She further minimized her complicity in the 1994 genocide by frequently revisiting the subject of 
how most high-level MRND leaders had managed to flee Rwanda in the last days of the 1994 
genocide, leaving mid-level collaborators like herself to bear criminal responsibility for the 
genocide. She used Agathe Habyarimana as an example of a woman who had done much to 
organize and incite violence from behind the scenes, and who was nonetheless living 
comfortably in France.32 Valerie revisited this theme of political betrayal and disenfranchisement 
  
throughout our conversations, condemning her superiors within the MRND and RTLM for 
having abandoned her and the other civilian génocidaires to stand trial in their place.  
Unlike Egidie and the other female génocidaires, however, Valerie did not hold the RPF 
accountable for her imprisonment, nor did she seem hostile toward the RPF more generally. She 
expressed gratitude and optimism when speaking about the RPF: gratitude for having saved her 
from a horrible life as a refugee in the DRC by arresting her; and optimism for release once the 
RPF realized she had been a pawn for the MRND.33 However, she was also set apart from most 
of the female génocidaires I interviewed at that time by her refusal to blame her imprisonment 
and subsequent suffering on the fact that she was a woman, preferring to condemn her superiors 
in the MRND for having manipulated her and then left her to take responsibility for their crimes.  
 
Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this article has been to address the tendency for Rwandans and the 
international community more generally to dismiss female génocidaires solely as monsters, in 
large part due to the preconceived gender norms that surround ideals for women¶s behavior in 
times of peace and conflict. In Rwanda, this tendency has negatively impacted the lives of 
female génocidaires in several ways: they endure stigmatization from their families, their 
communities, and Rwandan society more broadly that can range from abandonment to 
disproportionately severe prison sentences compared to their male counterparts. Peasant female 
génocidaires appear to feel this gender-based discrimination more keenly than elite female 
génocidaires, or at the very least are more vocal in framing their claims to victimization in the 
post-genocide period in these terms. They recognized that by having allegedly participated in the 
torture, murder, and mutilation of their Tutsi compatriots, they were perceived as having violated 
  
important taboos related to women¶s conduct and were being punished accordingly. As an 
example of this, I have drawn upon interviews with Devota, who expressed resentment and 
dismay at the fact that her identity as both a Rwandan and a woman had been obliterated through 
the process of being arrested, imprisoned, and tried for Category 2 and 3 crimes. Devota 
maintained her innocence, arguing that the allegations against her were motivated by 
interpersonal conflict arising from a land dispute. However, once labeled a génocidaire, Devota 
found herself caught up in Rwanda¶s transitional justice system in which her refusal to confess 
and express remorse for her alleged crimes was treated as an additional offense, resulting in a 
disproportionately harsh prison sentence. The narratives of Egidie and Valerie then provided 
contrasting examples of elite female génocidaires accused of more serious Category 1 crimes. 
Both women seemed more resilient to the gender-based discrimination endured by Devota, or at 
the very least, used different vocabulary to frame their disenfranchisement in the post-genocide 
period.  
Taken together, these narratives suggest that we know very little about the lived 
experiences and legal journeys of female génocidaires within Rwanda, due in part to the 
tendency to cast them in sensationalist terms as monsters. My ethnographic encounters with 
female génocidaires demonstrates the value of engaging with these women not only through trial 
transcripts and related legal materials, for example, but as complex human beings with lives 
beyond the genocide. As part of this, these women²while perhaps guilty of having committed 
crimes related to the 1994 genocide²have also endured suffering in the post-genocide period, 
arguably disproportionate to that of their male counterparts. Thus, by providing these women 
with space to discuss their lived experiences surrounding the genocide on their own terms, a 
more nuanced series of images of female génocidaires emerges: one that challenges the common 
  
perception of female génocidaires as monsters and establishes a framework for considering these 
women as full human beings capable of acts along the spectrum between brutality and kindness. 
Furthermore, this framework could provide a starting point for a more accurate understanding of 
how women come to be involved in genocide, as well as cross-cultural comparison of women¶V 
criminal actions in other episodes of political violence.34 
That said, this is not a popular framework for post-genocide Rwanda: many Rwandans, 
particularly genocide survivors and returnees, understandably find it morally repugnant to 
approach the plights of convicted génocidaires with empathy or compassion, as do many 
Rwandan and foreign scholars (Tertsakian 2011: 211). During interviews with survivors and 
government officials, I was often warned against allowing myself to be taken in by the lies and 
manipulations of génocidaires. And indeed, I did encounter rumors, lies, evasions, denials, and 
silences that often complicated my ability to make sense of my participants¶ life history. Such 
meta-data was frequently present not only in my ethnographic work with génocidaires, but also 
in my interviews with government officials, returnees, genocide survivors, and other participants. 
But as noted by Lee Ann Fujii, the presence of this meta-data, while requiring careful 
contextualization, does not render the overall ethnographic encounter irrelevant. Conversely, 
discussion of rumors, lies, evasions, denials, and silences can ³open up new forms of dialogue 
and public debates, which can lead to disclosures of new truths and knowledge´ (Fujii 2010: 
240). In the case of this article, it has prompted deeper consideration of how individual Rwandan 
women came to be labeled, whether justly or injustly, as génocidaires, and how their subsequent 
post-genocide experiences of Rwanda¶s transitional justice program then differed accorded to 
their socioeconomic status.  
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Notes
                                                 
1 The term génocidaire, while rooted in the French word génocideur, is distinctly Rwandan and 
references individuals who committed crimes during the 1994 genocide, from organizing and 
inciting violence against Rwanda¶s minority Tutsi population to directly participating in the 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
violence through acts such as informing on civilians who were in hiding, looting Tutsi-owned 
properties and possessions, and/or raping, torturing, and murdering Tutsi civilians. In Rwanda 
WRGD\WKHWHUPLVSULPDULO\DSSOLHGWRPHPEHUVRIWKHQDWLRQ¶V+XWXPDMRULW\ZKRKDYHEHHQ
convicted for perpetrating atrocities against Tutsi civilians during the 1994 genocide. However, 
those wrongfully accused or released, having only committed minimal crimes like looting during 
the genocide, often find that the label follows them throughout their lives.  
2 On 24 June 2011, Nyiramasuhuko was found guilty of seven charges, including genocide and 
incitement to commit rape as a crime against humanity, and was sentenced to life in prison 
(ICTR 2011).  
3 Nicole Hogg (2010: 81) argues that female génocidaires who participated indirectly in the 
JHQRFLGHIUHTXHQWO\UHFHLYHGSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWUHODWHGWRWKH³FKLYDOU\´RIPHQZKHUHE\
³PDOHZLWQHVVHVLQYHVWLJDWRUVSURVHFXWRUVDQGMXGJHVDUHVRLQIHFWHGE\JHQGHUVWHUHRW\SHVWKDW
they either cannot perceive of women as criminals or feel protective towards them in spite of 
WKHLUVXVSHFWHGRUSURYHQFULPLQDOLW\´+RZHYHUZKHQGLUHFWFULPLQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUPXUGHU
mutilation, or other serious crimes was established, female génocidaires ZHUH³UHJDUGHGDVµHYLO¶
RUµQRQ-ZRPHQ¶DQGWUHDWHGZLWKWKHIXOOIRUFHRIWKHODZ´+RJJ 
4 According to the revised 2004 genocide law, Rwanda acknowledges three categories of 
génocidaires. Category 1 includes individuals who occupied positions of leadership surrounding 
the genocide and who were responsible for planning and organizing the violence. Typical 
sentences range from 25 years to life. Category 2 encapsulates individuals who participated in 
murders and serious attacks, and warrants sentences from 3 to 30 years depending on the number 
and severity of the crimes and whether the accused confesses. Category 3 is for individuals who 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
are accused of crimes against property, and is typically punished through reparations (Tertsakian 
2008: 354).  
5 In addition to the eight female génocidaires I interviewed, I interviewed twelve men who had 
been convicted of crimes related to the 1994 genocide. 
6 In addition to this initial research trip, I returned to Rwanda in 2011 and 2012 to conduct 
shorter fieldwork visits for a different project.  
7 The decision to interview only those génocidaires who had confessed or been convicted of 
crimes resulted from the ethics review process at my university, which was adamant that I not 
recruit anyone who might expect a reduced sentence or who might face new charges as a result 
of their participation in the study. The 20 convicted génocidaires I interviewed represent a small 
fraction of the estimated 175,000 to 210,000 individuals who are believed to have direct criminal 
responsibility for organizing and implementing the genocide (Straus 2004). 
8 The RPF was formed in Uganda and so most of its original members are fluent English 
speakers with minimal knowledge of French. Upon wresting control of Rwanda in July 1994, the 
53)LPSOHPHQWHGDQXPEHURISROLFLHVDLPHGDWUHMHFWLQJ5ZDQGD¶VFRORQLDOSDVWXQGer German 
and later Belgian rule, and ensuring the prosperity of its members. Rwanda became part of the 
Commonwealth in 2009 and adopted English as an official language. Over the years, English has 
displaced French as the second official language of Rwanda, with profound implications for the 
political and economic landscape of the nation (Steflja 2012). 
9 5ZDQGD¶VSRVW-genocide policy of national unity and reconciliation has made public discussion 
of ethnicity taboo, with the stated goals of eliminating ethnic divisionism and ensuring the long-
term political stability of the nation (Thomson 2013: 108).  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
10 For example, several leaders of IBUKA²an umbrella group for genocide survivors¶ 
organizations²were forced into exile in 2000 following the allegedly government-orchestrated 
assassination of Assiel Kabera, the brother of IBUKA¶s vice president Josué Kayijaho (Longman 
2011: 30). The leadership of the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human 
Rights (LIPRODHOR) has been vulnerable to similar forms of intimidation over the years, and 
as of 2013, individuals believed to be more favorable to the RPF have overtaken its board (HRW 
2013).  
11 In referencing nationalized mourning and commemoration, I am building on a conversation 
initiated by Jennie Burnet (2009: 80±110; 2012: 92±109). 
12 (OVHZKHUH6XVDQ7KRPVRQDQG-HVVHHKDYHFKDUDFWHUL]HG5ZDQGDDVD³KLJKO\
SROLWLFL]HGUHVHDUFKVHWWLQJ´LQZKLFKWKHJRYHUQPHQWVHHNVWRFRQWUROKRZ5ZDQGDQVVSHDN
about the 1994 genocide, and Rwandan history more generally.  
13 )RUUDUHH[DPSOHVRI5ZDQGDQZRPHQZKRVHLPSDFWRQWKHQDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\KDVEHHQ
GRFXPHQWHGLQRUDOWUDGLWLRQDQGZULWWHQKLVWRULHVVHHWKDWRI5ZDQGD¶VILUVW4XHHQ0RWKHU
1\LUDWXQJDZKRIRXJKWWRKDYHDZRPDQLQFOXGHGDPRQJWKHFRXUW¶s ritualists during her reign 
:DWNLQVRU1\LUDUXF\DEDGDXJKWHURI5ZDQGD¶VP\WKLFDOIRXQGHU*LKDQJDZKRLV
considered responsible for the domestication of the first cattle (Mukarutabana n.d.). 
14 There are a number of exceptions to this statement throughout Rwandan history, wherein elite 
Rwandan women²mostly Queen Mothers such as Nyiramongi (Vansina 2004: 144, 151) and 
Kanjogera (Des Forges 2011: 22±23), or spiritual leaders such as Nyirashirembere (Vansina 
2004: 137), who led a rebellion against the Tutsi population in Fugi²committed atrocities.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
15 7KRXJKUHIHUUHGWRDVDEORRGOHVVFRXSRYHUWKHQH[WWZR\HDUVPDQ\RI.D\LEDQGD¶VLQQHU
circle were executed, while Kayibanda was intentionally starved to death (Prunier 1995: 82). 
16 According to Stephen Kinzer (2008: 34), the Tutsi exiles first referred to themselves as inyenzi 
(cockroaches) in the early 1960s ³to symbolize their nocturnal habits and their conviction that no 
amount of effort would eliminate them. Later their enemies began to use it, arguing that it was 
appropriate because the rebels, like cockroaches, were filthy invaders who defiled clean places´ 
17 Several studies of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide (Fujii 2009; Mironko 2004; Straus 2006) 
have found that Hutu civilians rarely participated explicitly due to a genocidal desire to 
annihilate the Tutsi. Straus (2006) argues that fear was a common motivating factor for 
participation, in particular the belief that if the predominantly Tutsi RPF gained control, the Hutu 
would experience renewed repression, similar to that which they allegedly endured while ruled 
by the predominantly Tutsi monarchy prior to Rwandan independence in 1962 (Jessee and 
Watkins 2014). In addition, Fujii (2009: 12) argues local conceptions of ethnicity merely 
provided a script according to which people acted out violence. In the absence of blinding ethnic 
hatred, the more common factor that motivated Hutu peasants to commit atrocities was a desire 
to maintain, reinforce, or establish new social and political ties within their communities in 
anticipation of a Hutu victory. 
18 Controversy has emerged over which parties to the conflict are responsible for Habyarimana¶s 
assassination. A Belgian journalist reported that two French soldiers were responsible for the 
assassination, while Etienne Sengegera, the Rwandan ambassador to the DRC alleged that 
Belgian peacekeepers were to blame (Prunier 1995: 213±214). RPF supporters allege that 
Habyarimana¶s inner circle had him assassinated because they felt he had betrayed the Hutu 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
cause (Des Forges 1999: 182). In 2010, the Rwandan government released the ³Mutsinzi Report´
(Republic of Rwanda 2010), which argues that the Rwandan Armed Forces were responsible for 
engineering and implementing Habyarimana¶s assassination. These findings were loosely 
FRQILUPHGE\WKHSUHOLPLQDU\³7Upvidic report´7Upvidic and Poux 2012), though critics have 
noted that both the Mutsinzi and Trévidic reports failed to take into consideration the testimonies 
of ex-RPF combatants who claim Kagame was responsible for orchestrating Habyarimana¶s 
assassination (Schofield 2012). 
19 The number of victims of the 1994 genocide is controversial, with mid-range estimates²
including the one cited by Alison Des Forges (1999: 15±16) that is cited here²concluding that 
between 400,000 and 800,000 Rwandans died.  
20 This mass flight was in part made possible by Opération Turquoise, a French peace-keeping 
initiative that was allegedly intended to provide protection to civilians in eastern Rwanda. In 
practice, it created a safe corridor for Hutu elites responsible for organizing and inciting the 
genocide to flee Rwanda and, at least momentarily, escape the RPF (Des Forges 1999: 682±684).  
21 Rwandans are roughly divided according to six socio-economic categories. The majority 
peasant population consists of those who live in abject poverty (abatindi nyakujya), those who 
are destitute (abatindi), and those who are merely poor (abakene). Next are those peasants with 
the economic means to support themselves, often as elected officials (abakene bifashiije). 
5ZDQGD¶VPRUHSULYLOHJHGDQGZHDOWK\PLQRULW\LVWKHQGLYLGHGDVHLWKHUULFKEXWODFNLQJPRQH\
(abakungu) or rich (abakire). Thomson (2013: 6±7, 16±17) argues that this socio-economic 
KLHUDUFK\FRQQRWHVPRUHWKDQDSHUVRQ¶VILQDQFLDOVHFXULW\EXWDOVRLQGLFDWHVKRZYXOQHUDEOH
they are to emotional or physical neglect by government officials and state-led interventions.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
22 This is notable because for many Rwandans, gacaca constitutes a source of tension within the 
community (Ingelaere 2009; Rettig 2011; Thomson and Nagy 2011). For example, survivors are 
often coerced by district-level officials into testifying against accused génocidaires, and in the 
process, can bring violence upon themselves from the families and friends of the person against 
whom they testify. In other instances, civilians report fearing land disputes and other forms of 
interpersonal conflict within their communities could prompt members of their community to 
make false allegations against them. 
23 In Rwanda, accused génocidaires can receive reduced sentences if they confess and 
demonstrate remorse before gacaca. This presents a particular challenge for those who have been 
wrongly accused, however. If found guilty based on witness testimonies and circumstantial 
evidence, the wrongly accused may receive disproportionately harsh sentences compared to 
actual génocidaires who confess to having perpetrated actual crimes.  
24 While many peasant Rwandans have family in prison for crimes related to the genocide, 
people often choose to distance themselves lest their support for their loved one be 
misinterpreted by the authorities as support for their alleged genocidal actions or resistance to 
national unity and reconciliation, prompting the authorities to take a negative interest (Tertsakian 
2011: 212). 
25 In Le Château, Carina Tertsakian (2008) describes these work spaces, and the women¶s 
sections of Rwanda¶s prisons more generally, in more positive terms, highlighting the 
camaraderie that exists between women and their efforts to make life within the prisons more 
pleasant.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
26 Esperance, a young mother of two, confessed to committing murder as part of a larger mob 
that surrounded a Tutsi neighbor and beat her to death using clubs. Esperance was unsure who 
VWUXFNWKHOHWKDOEORZEXWDVD³ZHDNZRPDQ´VKHDUJXHGVKHZDVLQFDSDEOHRIKDYLQJ
committed murder. Nonetheless, she confessed to this murder, as well as to indirect complicity in 
several other murders where she cheered on the attackers. For these crimes, she was sentenced to 
25 years in prison. 
27 The RPA was the military arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
28 Valerie insisted I use her real name. My other génocidaire participants requested that their 
anonymity be maintained, and so I use pseudonyms in all other instances. 
29 Under presidents Kayibanda and Habyarimana, Rwandans were taught an official narrative 
that demonized the Tutsi minority and their monarchy for having enslaved the Hutu majority 
GXULQJ5ZDQGD¶VSUH-colonial and colonial periods (King 2014; Newbury 2002).  
30 In 1991, the RPF created Radio Muhabura in an effort to spread pro-RPF propaganda. Later, 
its mandate expanded to include convincing Hutu civilians to resist the genocide ideology 
promoted by the Hutu extremist radio station, RTLM (Des Forges 1999: 68). 
31 A selection of RTLM transcripts, including commentaries by Bemeriki, are available online in 
English, French, and Kinyarwanda via the Montreal Institute of Genocide and Human Rights 
Studies Web site (http://migs.concordia.ca/links/RwandanRadioTrascripts_RTLM.htm), as well 
as the Rwanda File Web site (http://www.rwandafile.com/rtlm/list3.html).  
32 In actual fact, Agathe Habyarimana was at the time living in a state of self-enforced house 
arrest in Paris, and in significant danger of being extradited to Rwanda to face charges of inciting 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
genocide (Duval Smith 2007). In 2010, she was arrested by French police executing a Rwanda-
issued arrest warrant and released on bail to await trial in France (BBC 2010, 2011). 
33 Valerie Bemeriki was sentenced to life in prison in 2009 (BBC 2009). I have been unable to 
interview her again, but it would be interesting to see how her sentence has shaped her opinion of 
the RPF. 
34 6HHIRUH[DPSOH'DUD.D\&RKHQ¶VZRUNRQIHPDOHSHUSHWUDWors in Sierre Leone 
RU6ZDWL3DUDVKDU¶VSXEOLFDWLRQVRQIHPDOHPLOLWDQWVLQ.DVKPLUDQG6UL/DQND
There is now a large enough body of literature on female combatants, génocidaires, and related 
perpetrators to begin building fruitful comparative studies on the subject. 
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